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Social Corporatism and Capital Accumulation: The Fate of the 
Nordic Model
Jonathan Perraton, University of Sheffi eld, UK.
The recent crisis of Anglo-Saxon capitalism has gener-
ated renewed interest in more cooperative national ar-
rangements, partly in view of the relative resilience of Nor-
dic economies. Strong trade unions operating through 
coordinated wage bargaining systems combined with 
developed welfare states appeared capable of deliver-
ing successful economic performance with relatively high 
levels of equality. Much of the recent academic and policy 
discussion of these arrangements has focused on wheth-
er they are effective at achieving suffi cient wage fl exibility 
to ensure low rates of unemployment. In earlier work, by 
contrast, capital accumulation was regarded as central to 
ensuring growth of wages and employment over the me-
dium and longer term.
The concept of social corporatism 
Corporatism is a multifaceted concept, covering organ-
ised systems of wage bargaining, the role of state inter-
mediation and the scope of agreements negotiated in 
national economies. There is no neat defi nition of social 
corporatism, although it has often been identifi ed with 
Nordic countries. These arrangements typically had their 
origins in inter-war developments and were institutional-
ised in post-war settlements. Nordic countries operated 
strongly coordinated wage bargaining systems, with high 
levels of union membership. The Nordics have maintained 
high trade union membership, in contrast to falling den-
sity elsewhere, and very extensive coverage of collective 
agreements.1 Similarly, collective organisation of employ-
ers remains strong.
Union bargaining had solidaristic objectives in terms of 
compressing wage differentials among enterprises and 
© The Author(s) 2018. Open Access: This article is distributed under the 
terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License 
(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unre-
stricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, 
provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if chang-
es were made.
1 OECD: OECD Employment Outlook 2017, chapter 4, 2017, pp. 125-
173.
industries. National wage bargaining was to be driven by 
the sectors exposed to international competition (largely 
manufacturing in the post-war period), refl ecting the evo-
lution of world prices confronting small open economies 
and the productivity growth in the exposed industries 
(which were assumed to be the most technologically dy-
namic). Coordinated bargaining was designed to ensure 
that wage settlements throughout the economy were 
set according to rates validated by a capacity to main-
tain external competitiveness. These arrangements saw 
the evolution of bargaining regimes between organised 
labour and businesses combined with relatively egalitar-
ian societies and developed welfare states.2 Coordinated 
wage bargaining systems of this form may mitigate the 
potential downsides of union power; highly coordinated 
unions with large memberships have incentives to en-
sure bargains consistent with high levels of employment, 
avoiding insider-outsider splits.
The concept of social corporatism is essentially inclu-
sive, with wide coverage of arrangements. All four Nor-
dic economies score relatively highly on Jahn indicators 
of corporatism,3 although these fi gures have declined for 
Sweden since the 1980s. Vartiainen argues that the com-
mon perception that Nordic countries have moved from 
highly centralised to more decentralised bargaining sys-
tems is somewhat misleading.4 Differences between the 
economies have arisen as they have evolved in the post-
war period, yet clear similarities between them remain, as 
does clear continuity in key aspects over time. Central de-
termination of wage settlements was weaker in practice 
than sometimes supposed, but strong collective agree-
ments based around norms of external competitiveness 
remain.
Social corporatism can be distinguished here from com-
petitive or liberal corporatism. Defi nitions vary, but de-
spite the fact that liberal corporatist regimes have some 
2 J. P e k k a r i n e n , M. P o h j o l a , R. R o w t h o r n  (eds): Social Corporat-
ism: A Superior Economic System?, Oxford 1992, Oxford University 
Press.
3 D. J a h n : Changing of the guard: Trends in corporatist arrangements 
in 42 highly industrialized societies from 1960 to 2010, in: Socio-Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2016, pp. 47-71.
4 J. Va r t i a i n e n : Nordic Collective Agreements – A Continuous Institu-
tion in a Changing Economic Environment, in: L. M j ø s e t  (ed.): The 
Nordic Varieties of Capitalism, Comparative Social Research, Vol. 28, 
Bingley 2011, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp. 331-63.
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degree of coordinated wage bargaining, it may be less 
centralised than in social corporatist regimes. Crucially, 
liberal corporatism lacks the egalitarian imperative of so-
cial corporatism through solidaristic wage bargaining, and 
more broadly the pursuit of wider union goals. Austria, for 
example, had a coordinated wage bargaining system that 
shared features with Nordic arrangements but that exhib-
ited wider wage dispersion and considerably greater gen-
der inequality. The Dutch Polder model has been taken 
as an exemplar of new corporatist arrangements that can 
lead to low unemployment, but solidaristic bargaining is 
much weaker than it is under social corporatism. Further, 
negotiated wage moderation in the Netherlands led to a 
recovery of corporate profi tability but without a commen-
surate revival in investment.
Recently, social pacts have emerged in eurozone coun-
tries, but in comparison to social corporatism, these are 
less egalitarian and associated with weaker social ben-
efi ts and pay settlements below the productivity growth 
rate. Furthermore, such arrangements have come under 
increasing strain, and some have effectively been by-
passed under austerity programmes since the global fi -
nancial crisis.5 Nordic social corporatism is thus an alter-
native not just to Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalism but also 
to arrangements in other continental European econo-
mies.
The role of capital accumulation
Much of the recent discussion of corporatism has fo-
cused on whether coordinated wage bargaining systems 
can deliver low unemployment through negotiated ad-
justment. Calmfors and Driffi ll proposed a hump-shaped 
relationship between the degree of coordination of wage 
bargaining and unemployment rates – low unemployment 
can be achieved in highly decentralised systems, ap-
proximating Anglo-Saxon labour markets, but also under 
highly coordinated corporatist arrangements.6 Attempts 
to test whether corporatist systems actually deliver low 
levels of unemployment have often been inconclusive,7 al-
though some recent studies, including Storm and Naaste-
5 P. C u l p e p p e r, A. R e g a n : Why don’t governments need trade un-
ions anymore? The death of social pacts in Ireland and Italy, in: Socio-
Economic Review, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2014, pp. 723-45.
6 L. C a l m f o r s , J. D r i f f i l l : Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and 
Macroeconomic Performance, in: Economic Policy, Vol. 3, No. 6, 
1988, pp. 13-61.
7 See e.g. T. A i d t , Z. T z a n n a t o s : Trade unions, collective bargaining 
and macroeconomic performance, in: Industrial Relations Journal, 
Vol. 39, No. 4, 2008.
pad as well as Sturn, do fi nd evidence that corporatist 
systems are effective in this capacity.8
The focus of recent literature on short-run adjustment 
misses wider issues here. Investment and capital accu-
mulation remain central to growth in modern economies. 
Growth in services, as well as in manufacturing, generally 
requires new investment. Conceptually, economists have 
separated technological innovation from capital accumu-
lation; in practice, innovation is typically embodied in new 
equipment. Contrary to some economists’ priors, the rel-
ative egalitarianism of Nordic economies has not inhibited 
innovation. Indeed, they are amongst the most innovative 
economies in the world,9 and they also have high levels of 
ICT investment. Investment in skills is central to modern 
economies, but skilled workers also require new equip-
ment. Further, investment also leads to lower unemploy-
ment over the medium term.10
From the standpoint of labour in particular, social corpo-
ratist arrangements were not designed simply to achieve 
high levels of employment through wage restraint. Flexible 
labour markets of the Anglo-Saxon type can in principle 
achieve that. Competitive corporatist arrangements may 
also achieve this, often through keeping wage increases 
below the rate of productivity growth and reducing em-
ployment protection and social security entitlements. In 
some economic interpretations, corporatism has come 
to be seen essentially as a device to reduce uncertainty 
and enable coordination. Earlier interpretations of so-
cial corporatism, by contrast, saw investment as central 
– organised labour would exercise wage restraint in the 
expectation that the resulting profi ts would be invested, 
leading to growth of incomes and employment over the 
medium and longer term. For organised labour, in particu-
lar, the aim here of corporatist strategies was to achieve 
full employment through high-productivity and high-wage 
employment.
Bargaining relations between organised labour and fi rms 
over time can viewed in terms of non-cooperative games. 
Workers bargain over wages and fi rms determine invest-
ment (the “right to manage” principle). This can give rise 
to both the “workers’ dilemma” and the “capitalists’ di-
8 S. S t o r m , C. N a a s t e p a d : Macroeconomics Beyond the NAIRU, 
Cambridge MA 2012, Harvard University Press; and S. S t u r n : Are 
Corporatist Labour Markets Different? Labour Market Regimes and 
Unemployment in OECD Countries, in: International Labour Review, 
Vol. 152, No. 2, 2013, pp. 237-54.
9 D. O r n s t o n : When small states make big leaps: Institutional innova-
tion and high-tech competition in Western Europe, Ithaca 2012, Cor-
nell University Press.
10 M. K a r a n a s s o u , H. S a l a , P. S a l v a d o r : Capital Accumulation and 
Unemployment: New Insights on the Nordic Experience, in: Cam-
bridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 6, 2008, pp. 977-1001.
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lemma”. The workers’ dilemma is such: if they do not 
exercise wage restraint, the result will be low profi tabil-
ity and investment, and consequently workers will be un-
able to realise future increases in income from invest-
ment; conversely, though, they have no guarantee that 
wage restraint will result in suffi cient investment to bring 
about higher future incomes. The capitalists’ dilemma is 
such that they cannot guarantee future returns on their 
investment, as organised labour may be able to use its 
bargaining power to appropriate the gains from sunk in-
vestments. These two dilemmas lead to sub-optimal 
capital investment levels, i.e. the “dynamic ineffi ciency of 
capitalism”.11 Under quite general conditions, it cannot be 
assumed that the socially optimal solution will arise from 
repeated bargaining.
There are various possible remedies to this. Under certain 
conditions, coordinated unions with wide coverage can 
lead to cooperative solutions which yield higher capital 
accumulation and thereby higher growth of incomes over 
the medium and long term. Coordinated unions may be 
an effective method for delivering nationally negotiated 
deals – coordination among unions and among different 
levels of membership within unions may credibly ensure 
nationally negotiated wage deals are maintained at the 
local level. Given repeated rounds of bargaining, it may 
pay for each side to develop a reputation for cooperative 
behaviour; indeed, Blanchard and Philippon fi nd that Nor-
dic countries have relatively high levels of trust between 
labour and fi rms.12 Rather than seeking to identify the 
conditions for a defi nitive game theoretic solution, histori-
cal experience demonstrates that a durable compromise 
may emerge. Moses points out that the state may play a 
key intermediary role here.13 Governments wish to main-
tain growth through strong investment and are in a posi-
tion to offer inducements to each side to cooperate, such 
as the provision of social benefi ts for labour and fi scal in-
centives for investment for fi rms. This may act to discour-
age defection, dissuading labour from abandoning wage 
moderation and helping to induce sustained investment 
from fi rms.
Post-war social corporatist arrangements can be seen in 
these terms. Wage leadership by the exposed sector was 
suffi ciently general in post-war Nordic economies to be-
come known as the Scandinavian model of infl ation. This 
11 K. L a n c a s t e r : The Dynamic Ineffi ciency of Capitalism, in: Journal of 
Political Economy, Vol. 81, No. 5, 1973, pp. 1092-1109.
12 O. B l a n c h a rd , T. P h i l i p p o n : The Quality of Labor Relations and 
Unemployment, NBER Working Paper No. 10590, 2004.
13 J. M o s e s : The Social Democratic Predicament and Global Econom-
ic Integration: A Capital Dilemma, in: W. C o l e m a n , R. U n d e r h i l l 
(eds): Regionalism and Global Economic Integration, London 1998, 
Routledge.
would be expected to lead to roughly constant labour and 
capital shares in income. Iacono characterises the es-
sence of the Nordic model in terms of the compression 
of wage differentials, which leads to productivity growth 
from creative destruction by fostering the growth of rela-
tively high-productivity enterprises together with high 
public expenditure.14
The most systematic attempt to formalise social cor-
poratist arrangements was through the Rehn-Meidner 
model proposed by trade unions in post-war Sweden.15 
Fiscal policy was to be used to restrain infl ation and to 
achieve a public savings surplus. Infl ation would lead to 
higher profi t margins and tend to undermine the solidar-
istic wage bargaining. Under this macroeconomic policy 
stance, full employment was to be ensured through ac-
tive labour market policies. This was also central to the 
proposed role of solidaristic wage policies for structural 
change. Solidaristic bargaining would lead to wage pres-
sure on less effi cient fi rms whilst benefi tting more produc-
tive ones; the resulting transfer of labour to more effi cient 
fi rms would raise nationwide productivity. Expansionary 
macroeconomic policy could undermine this by allowing 
fi rms to raise profi t margins and lead to greater wage drift. 
Thus, the Rehn-Meidner model was predicated on simul-
taneously maintaining relatively low profi t margins and 
encouraging investment. A restrictive fi scal stance would 
enable an accumulation of public savings that could be 
channelled into investment; indirectly, investment was 
supported by generous tax allowances.
Evidence from Nordic economies provides some support 
for these expectations. Bengtsson found that although 
higher union density was associated with higher wage 
shares in the post-war period, the Nordics were an ex-
ception.16 However, Sweden diverged somewhat from the 
rest of the Nordics in this respect, experiencing a squeeze 
of the profi t share over the 1950s and 1960s and then a 
rise beginning in 1980.17 In practice, Martin shows, post-
war Sweden saw fl uctuations in profi t shares and invest-
ment levels rather than an entirely orderly exchange of 
14 R. I a c o n o : The Nordic Model of Economic Development and Wel-
fare: Recent Developments and Future Prospects, in: Intereconomics, 
Vol. 53, No. 4, 2018, pp. 185-190.
15 L. E r i x o n : Progressive supply-side economics: an explanation and 
update of the Rehn-Meidner model, in: Cambridge Journal of Eco-
nomics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2018, pp. 653-697.
16 E. B e n g t s s o n : Do unions redistribute income from capital to la-
bour? Union density and wage shares since 1960, in: Industrial Rela-
tions Journal, Vol. 45, No. 5, 2014, pp. 389-408.
17 E. B e n g t s s o n : Labour’s share in twentieth-century Sweden: a re-
interpretation, in: Scandinavian Economic History Review, Vol. 62, 
No. 3, 2014, pp. 290-314.
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wage moderation for high investment.18 Nevertheless, 
Landesmann and Vartiainen observed that over the 1960-
85 period, the Nordic economies maintained relatively 
high investment even with relatively low profi tability.19 The 
economic shocks of the 1970s and 1980s did hit these 
economies, and they faced increased diffi culty in main-
taining internal and external balance. However, Nordic 
economies appeared relatively successful at managing 
adjustment to these shocks. Henley and Tsakalotos found 
that social corporatist economies were better able to miti-
gate pressure on profi tability during the 1970s and 1980s 
slowdown through the management of potential distribu-
tional confl ict, whilst investment in these economies re-
mained relatively resilient to falls in the profi t share over 
this period.20
The weakening economic performance of Nordic coun-
tries led some observers to argue that it was no longer 
possible for these economies to simultaneously maintain 
the traditional objectives of egalitarian wage bargaining, 
full employment and fi scal balance.21 Despite wage bar-
gaining norms, all Nordic economies except energy-rich 
Norway required signifi cant devaluations to restore exter-
nal balance. Structural change led to a fall in employment 
in the exposed manufacturing sector and a rise in public 
sector employment, weakening traditional wage leader-
ship arrangements. Iversen argued that the expansion of 
the public sector reached its limits, with a weakened fi s-
cal position, whilst the compression of wage differentials 
inhibited the growth of relatively low productivity private 
services employment.22 These changes acted to under-
mine the Swedish model in ways that the Rehn-Meidner 
model had been designed to avoid – overheating in the 
1980s provided incentives for both fi rms and skilled work-
ers to defect from coordinated arrangements to the ex-
tent that such arrangements reduced fi rms’ discretion to 
offer higher wages.
Beginning in the 1970s, Swedish employers set out to 
undermine the post-war model, as Baccaro and Howell 
set out.23 This was partly a response to the unions’ Wage-
18 A. M a r t i n : Wages, Profi ts and Investment in Sweden, in: L. L i n d -
b e rg , C. M a i e r  (eds.): The Politics of Infl ation and Economic Stag-
nation, Washington DC 1985, Brookings Institution Press.
19 M. L a n d e s m a n n , J. Va r t i a i n e n : Social Corporatism and Long-
term Economic Performance, in: J. P e k k a r i n e n  et al., op. cit.
20 A. H e n l e y, E. Ts a k a l o t o s : Corporatism, Profi t Squeeze and In-
vestment, in: Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 15, No. 4, 1991, 
pp. 425-50.
21 T. I v e r s e n : Contested Economic Institutions: The Politics of Mac-
roeconomics and Wage Bargaining in Advanced Democracies, Cam-
bridge 1999, Cambridge University Press.
22  Ibid.
23 L. B a c c a ro , C. H o w e l l : Trajectories of neoliberal transformation: 
European industrial relations since the 1970s, Cambridge 2017, Cam-
bridge University Press.
Earner Fund moves to increase collective share own-
ership. Employer groups considered this a threat to the 
“right to manage” principle. Elsewhere amongst the Nor-
dics, as noted, bargaining systems have evolved, but they 
remain strongly coordinated. Exposed sector wage lead-
ership can still be seen to operate, and employers have 
continued to participate in corporatist arrangements.
Financial openness and capital accumulation
Although Nordic economies were thoroughly open to 
trade in the post-war period, until the 1980s the capital 
account was more regulated. Policies aimed at net pub-
lic sector savings meant that although the private cor-
porate sector was typically a net debtor in Sweden and 
elsewhere, with corporate borrowing and low household 
savings, this could be funded without recourse to foreign 
borrowing in the post-war boom. This was in line with 
the Rehn-Meidner model. A regulated capital account 
allowed Nordic countries to operate low interest rate 
policies. Kosonen found key similarities amongst Nordic 
economies in their savings and investment patterns be-
fore the 1980s.24
From the 1980s, Nordic economies pursued programmes 
of rapid fi nancial liberalisation and openness on the capi-
tal account. In Finland and Sweden in particular, this led 
to a credit boom and subsequent bust, with a major bank-
ing crisis and recession in the early 1990s. These devel-
opments strained the operation of national models, but 
they may also have longer-term implications.
Evolving bargains over investment effectively assume a fi -
nancial closed economy. In the theoretical limit case for a 
small open economy, the capital stock will be determined 
by the world interest rate and unions cannot affect the 
real wage. More generally, fi nancial openness in a world 
of economies with varying levels of union power would be 
expected to lead to capital outfl ows from highly unionised 
economies and to a decline in union bargaining power.25 
Moses argues that fi nancial liberalisation and integration 
acts to increase the exit possibilities for capital and there-
by acts to weaken the social bargain underwriting invest-
ment effort.26
The key context here is developments in profi tability. 
Figure 1 shows that the wage share tended to rise in the 
1960s and 1970s amongst Nordic economies, although 
24 K. K o s o n e n : Savings and Economic Growth from a Nordic Perspec-
tive, in: J. P e k k a r i n e n  et al., op. cit.
25 See e.g. M. A l o i , M. L e i t e - M o n t e i ro , T. L l o y d - B r a g a : Union-
ized labor markets and globalized capital markets, in: Journal of Inter-
national Economics, Vol. 78, No. 1, 2009, pp. 149-153.
26 J. M o s e s , op. cit.
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this was less pronounced than in other European econ-
omies. In practice, as noted particularly for the Swedish 
case, this was not a simple case of exchanging wage 
moderation for higher investment.
Wage shares have fallen in Nordic countries from the 
1980s, although they have stabilised somewhat since 
2000. This is consistent with developments in other Eu-
ropean economies and beyond. Wage restraint led to a 
recovery of profi t rates and shares to levels compara-
ble with or greater than those seen during the post-war 
golden age. However, even with this development and the 
falling real interest rates since the 1980s, weaker invest-
ment levels have persisted. Barba and Pivetti highlight 
that in developed economies, investment has been weak 
by historic standards, with the corporate sector in many 
countries becoming a net lender.27 This can also be ob-
served in Nordic economies, in contrast to their relatively 
strong investment performance earlier. In all four cases, 
investment has fallen as a share of profi ts relative to ear-
lier in the post-war period. In Denmark, the corporate 
sector has run surpluses since the 1980s. Finland shows 
a similar pattern; in the 1970s and 1980s, the corporate 
sector was typically a signifi cant net borrower, although 
developments since then are partly due to debt consoli-
dation following the early 1990s recession. In Norway, the 
corporate sector balance has fl uctuated over time, but 
again investment as a share of profi ts has fallen relative 
to the early post-war period. The Swedish case is similar 
to Finland, refl ecting a similar response to the early 1990s 
fi nancial crisis and recession, namely corporate consoli-
dation. There has only been a modest recovery in the pro-
pensity to invest since the early 1990s downturn.
27 A. B a r b a , M. P i v e t t i : Distribution and accumulation in post-1980 
advanced capitalism, in: Review of Keynesian Economics, No. 1, 
2012, pp. 126-42.
Thus, although wage restraint has generally operated in 
Nordic economies since the 1980s, this has not led to the 
investment response seen earlier in the post-war period. 
There are a number of explanations for this. Financial lib-
eralisation has increased companies’ external options, 
which have in turn increased pressure for shareholder 
value maximisation. Outward foreign direct investment 
(FDI) has grown strongly for all these economies. There 
has also been signifi cant growth of inward FDI into these 
economies, particularly since 2000, and fi rm ownership 
has become more transnational. Bergholm and Bieler ar-
gue that centralised bargaining systems persisted longer 
in Finland than Sweden because of the greater interna-
tionalisation of Swedish companies; however, transna-
tional companies have been actively undermining Fin-
land’s bargaining system since 2007.28
Conclusions: The future of the Nordic model
Repeated reports of the death of the Nordic model have 
turned out to be exaggerated (and often based on a singu-
lar focus on the Swedish case). Economic problems in the 
1980s and 1990s refl ected adjustment to a series of shocks; 
Nordic economies adapted to these shocks, and their sub-
sequent performance does not indicate that their medium-
run growth or unemployment performance is weak.
There is continuity in key aspects of these economies. Un-
ion membership is high and bargaining systems remain in 
place. Inequality has risen but remains comparatively low, 
and extensive welfare states have been maintained. In 
the post-war period, Nordic economies developed social 
corporatist coordinated wage bargaining systems that 
underpinned their economic performance, combining 
low unemployment with low levels of inequality. A large 
body of economic literature has focused on Sweden, 
where post-war bargaining systems had come under in-
creasing strain and some of their key aspects appeared to 
have been eroded; in other Nordic economies, however, 
there has been strong continuity in these systems. In this 
sense, social corporatist systems remain viable.
Nevertheless, this paper argues that the capital side of 
the social democratic bargain, largely neglected in recent 
critical accounts, has been eroded. Despite the recovery 
of profi t rates and shares in these economies (and most 
OECD countries), there has not been a return to the rates 
of capital accumulation seen earlier in the post-war period. 
Whilst the effective trade of wage moderation for sustained 
investment never actually operated as neatly as models 
28 T. B e rg h o l m , A. B i e l e r : Globalization and the erosion of the Nor-
dic model: A Swedish-Finnish comparison, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2013, pp. 55-70.
Figure 1
Adjusted wage share
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suggested, Nordic economies were able to sustain relative-
ly strong investment performance even into the 1970s and 
1980s. It is not clear that strongly corporatist economies 
had any particular advantage during the 1990s at ensuring 
orderly adjustment and maintaining investment and growth 
over the medium term. Indeed, the fi nancial liberalisation 
boom and bust in the late 1980s and early 1990s disrupted 
corporatist relations in these countries. The subsequent 
recession led to high unemployment in Finland and Swe-
den. In the post-war period, Nordic economies had rela-
tively limited fi nancial systems and relatively closed exter-
nal capital accounts. But fi nancial liberalisation since the 
1980s has increased the external capital options, a devel-
opment that has undermined the social corporatist bargain 
that had previously led to high investment.
There are some notable aspects of the Nordic model 
that may be worth highlighting. Recent research into 
weak productivity performance since the fi nancial crisis 
has highlighted the importance of the gap between the 
most productive fi rms and the rest. While wage compres-
sion may only be one possible mechanism to promote 
the relative growth of productive fi rms, it does appear to 
be effective in promoting productivity growth in Nordic 
economies. Second, although Swedish unions’ plans for 
a Wage-Earners Fund were never realised in their radical 
conception, public wealth remains high not just in Nor-
way, with its sovereign wealth fund, but also in Finland 
and Sweden.29 This is in marked contrast to the decline 
in public capital amongst other developed economies, 
as highlighted in the 2018 World Inequality Report.30 The 
general rise in the capital share has already been noted; 
typically this tends to raise inequality given the concen-
tration of capital ownership. Greater collective capital 
ownership is one possible means of mitigating this.
Finally, the Nordic economies themselves have still ex-
hibited what Offer and Sö derberg term the “market turn” 
away from social democratic systems of collective provi-
sion towards market-based systems based on personal 
accumulation of fi nancial assets (particularly property).31 
Nordic economies have amongst the highest house-
hold debt-to-income ratios, albeit offset by high levels of 
household wealth. The global fi nancial crisis has raised 
questions over the sustainability of such systems.
29 Y. H a s s e l b e rg , H. O h l s s o n : Collective Wealth Formation: Confl ict 
and Compromise in Sweden, 1950-2000, in: P. H u d s o n , K. Tr i b e 
(eds.): The Contradictions of Capital in the Twenty-fi rst Century: The 
Piketty Opportunity, Newcastle 2016, Agenda Publishing, pp. 109-
130.
30 F. A l v a re d o , L. C h a n c e l , T. P i k e t t y, E. S a e z , G. Z u c m a n : 
World Inequality Report 2018, World Inequality Lab, pp. 154-195.
31 A. O f f e r, G. S ö  d e r b e rg : The Nobel factor: The prize in economics, 
social democracy, and the market turn, Princeton NJ 2016, Princeton 
University Press.
